[Séminaire CREM Caen] The probability to satisfy axioms: a non-binary perspective on economic design, voting and social choice

The probability to satisfy axioms: a non-binary perspective on economic design, voting and social choice
Présentation de Pierre Bardier (PSE)
Abstract:
We provide a formal framework accounting for a very common intuition in the social choice literature: analytically established incompatibilities should be qualified by the plausibility of axioms' violations. In consistency with the increasing use of simulation models aiming at assessing the empirical performance of rules, we define the degree to which a given rule satisfies an axiom based on a probability distribution defined over the inputs that this rule takes. We then propose and characterise a criterion to evaluate and compare rules given a set of axioms, and a criterion to measure axioms' compatibility between each other for a given rule, building on an analogy with cooperative game theory.